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Philosophers have traditionally devoted much attention to the study of 
language, but have not considered the wider topic of signs to be worth its own 
discipline. Charles Peirce however once wrote: 
 
"...It has never been in my power to study anything -- mathematics, 
metaphysics, gravitation, thermodynamics, optics, chemistry, comparative 
anatomy, gravitation, astronomy, psychology, phonetics, economics, the 
history of science, whist, men and women, wine, metrology -- except as a 
study of semeiotic." (cited p. 7) 
 
This book provides a comprehensive and scholarly presentation of Peirce's 
extremely rich semeiotic theory. Peirce is notorious for the sheer quantity of 
frightening-looking terminology he coined, particularly in his writings on 
semeiotic, and thus this book performs a valuable service for Peircean studies. 
Liszka does not attempt a critique of Peirce's semeiotic theory, nor a 
comparison of it with those of other semioticians. His goal is to reconstruct and 
present Peirce's theory from the welter of manuscripts the first pragmatist 
produced during a frenzied writing career spanning five decades, and "simply 
to present it sympathetically and in the best light possible." (p. x). 
 
Two features of Peirce's semeiotic in particular could well confront the 
Australasian philosopher with conceptual hurdles. First of all, signs for Peirce 
are not restricted to the activities of the human mind, (to what Brentano called 
"the intentional"). Rather, Peirce claimed that every sign partakes of a particular 
formal structure which, though it appears in its most striking and sophisticated 
form in human language, is in fact suffused throughout the natural order. 
Peirce's approach to semeiotic differs markedly in this respect from the 
"semiology" pioneered by Saussure early this century, which Saussure saw as 
"part of social psychology" (p. 15). Some confusion on this topic can be fostered 
by the fact that Peirce sometimes did write popularly as if signs were purely 
intentional. This however he called his "sop to Cerberus", Cerberus being the 
beast at the mouth of Plato's cave one placates if one is to pass on wisdom 
without being eaten. 
 
This first possible obstacle to understanding Peirce's semeiotic is perhaps 
increasingly less problematic now, post-Darwin. The second obstacle however, 
is that signs have an irreducibly triadic structure. A sign consists of not just the 
Quinean "word and object", but also what Peirce calls an "interpretant" ("a sign 
which translates and develops the original sign", p. 19.)  This is just to say that a 
sign must represent an object such that it is capable of  being understood (as 
such further understanding  just consists in the generation of further signs). 
Thus, signs themselves can never be properly conceptualised on the dyadic 
model of (efficient) cause and effect which has characterised naturalistic study 
of language and the mind since the Early Modern period. This is not to say that 
Peirce is antinaturalistic about language and the mind, but to say that his 
naturalism takes an original and potentially very challenging form. 
 
1. The Discipline of Semeiotic  
 
Here Liszka sets out the place Peirce saw semeiotic as occupying within a 
(Comte-inspired) hierarchical classification of the sciences according to which 
each branch of science draws laws and principles from the science(s) above it, 
and observational data from the science(s) below. First of all, Liszka notes that 
semiotics is a formal discipline, "one that aims at discerning the necessary 
conditions for the subject it studies (p. 1)" The profound influence of Kant on 
Peirce is evident here. Yet this is no mere anachronistic characterisation of 
science, given its likeness to the entirely contemporary Turing-led formal study 
of computation. In this regard, it has been suggested that Peirce's conception of 
the sign is to concretely realised signs as Turing's conception of the machine is 
to concretely realised machines (Joseph Ransdell, Peirce-l@ttacs6.ttu.edu, 1997). 
 
Semeiotic lies above all empirical sciences, as indeed does all of the science of 
philosophy of which it is a sub-branch. Semeiotic lies below mathematics, 
however, for Peirce crowns his classification of the sciences with mathematics 
understood very broadly as "the science that draws necessary conclusions" (not 
to be confused with "the science of drawing necessary conclusions", which is 
logic). 
 
Semeiotic is a normative science, given that Peirce sees signification construed 
even in his very broad and naturalistic sense to be irreducibly teleological. To 
what end is semiosis tending? It tends ultimately (in the long run) towards 
truth, again construed very broadly, as "settled" signs - signs which have ceased 
to contradict each other with respect to the objects they signify. Since all 
empirical sciences draw on the concept of truth yet do not themselves study it, 
they must rely (whether explicitly or de facto) on leading principles from 
semeiotic with respect to this vital notion. Liszka sums up his general 
characterisation of semiotics thus: "Semeiotic, as a branch of philosophy, is a 
formal, normative science that is specifically concerned with the question of 
truth as it can be expressed and known through the medium of signs..." (p. 14.) 
 
2. Semeiotic Grammar 
 
Liszka now begins explicating Peirce’s complex semeiotic architectonic. 
Trichotomies abound. The chapter is divided most broadly into a discussion of 
signs' "formal conditions", their "typology"  and "classification". Formal 
conditions of signhood are just those characteristics that make something a sign 
in the first place. "A sign must correlate with or represent an object", it must do 
so "in some respect or capacity", it must "determine (potentially...or actually) an 
interpretant", and "The relation among sign...object and interpretant must be 
triadic" (pp. 18-19). The three aspects of this triadic relation are discussed in 
detail.  
 
The typology of signs covers the multi-dimensional natural kinds into which 
Peirce thought signs fell. Just one notable example is the three sign types "icon", 
"index" and "symbol". Icons signify their object by possessing some sort of 
structural resemblance to that object, as maps do. Indices signify by direct 
causal interaction with the object in question, a paradigmatic case here being a 
footprint. Symbols however are only associated with their object via a habit of 
some form, for an example of which we need go no futher than words. The 
classification of signs is somewhat similar to the typology, except that, (Liszka 
claims somewhat vaguely) "it is an attempt to organise types in a way that 
shows their affinities (p. 43). 
 
3. Critical Logic 
 
Critical Logic concerns itself with the subset of sign-use which may be called 
"reasoning" or argumentation, and the question of how inferences may be made 
as truth-preserving as possible. Thus, Peirce calls it the study of "the formal 
conditions of the truth of symbols" (p. 53) To this end Peirce devoted a great 
deal of energy to tracing out the "anatomy" of arguments. He though that 
though arguments are living entities with an organic structure, one can discern 
within every successful argument a "leading principle", premises, "colligation", 
"involvement" and a conclusion. Of course Peirce also produced a detailed, 
multiply layered  typology of arguments, of which the highest-level trichotomy 
concerns their "leading principles" (their source and type of validity):  
deduction, induction and (the less familiar) abduction. 
 
 
4. Universal Rhetoric 
 
Where semeiotic grammar studies the formal conditions of signs qua signs , and 
critical logic studies the formal conditions of truth, this branch of Peirce's 
thought, which is also called "speculative rhetoric", studies the formal 
conditions of inquiry (that is, the attainment of truth). How is this achieved? 
Liszka admits that this is the least developed area of Peirce's thought, yet 
claims that, "Once it is understood what Peirce meant by universal rhetoric, it 
becomes clear that a great deal of his work is dedicated to it (p. 78)." Under this 
heading Liszka discusses Peircean formal conditions of community, of 
communication, and the famous four methods of settling opinion. 
 
The writing of this book must have been arduous given the wealth of references 
to manuscripts spanning Peirce's career scattered across every page.  Most of 
the book consists in the careful definition of Peirce's many semeiotic 
neologisms, and the delineation of the place of each one of them in Peirce's 
semeiotic theory -- a tour de force of scholarship. Yet this is the source of my only 
query with respect to this book's value.  
 
Peirce was indeed an extremely systematic philosopher, in search of the 
ultimate classification of human knowledges, and the organon which would 
breathe life into the structure in a new and surprising way for the next 2000 
years. He is the last (or perhaps just the latest?) of the great system-builders of 
the Western tradition. And yet, an interesting question is whether presenting a 
"general introduction" to Peirce’s semiotic thinking in such a purely scholarly 
way (the way that the great system-builders are presented to undergraduates 
today) somehow misses the point of his thinking.  It is arguable that one cannot 
understand Peirce aside from his pragmatism, which was nothing more than an 
attempt to bring to philosophy the thinking which sent the natural sciences into 
the Scientific Revolution. Which is just to say that Peirce invented his many 
semeiotic concepts only that they might be used, in genuinely problematic 
situations, to discover things nobody knew before. Perhaps a general 
introduction to his semeiotic which could introduce the reader to such a use of 
semeiotic terms would do an even better job at conveying their meaning. 
 
This is not the book to spark an interest in Peirce in a philosopher who has not 
previously been introduced to him. However, for someone who already has 
this interest, and would like to follow it into the heart of Peirce's thinking, this 
careful, thorough book should prove most helpful. 
